Holli M. Mahoskey and Charles Mahoskey v. Ogden Clinic, Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Dr. Chris Christensen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Holli M. Mahoskey and Charles Mahoskey v.
Ogden Clinic, Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Dr. Chris
Christensen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard W. Campbell; Campbell and Neeley; Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Ogden Clinic
and Dr. Boyd Farr.
Douglas M. Durbano; Paul H. Johnson; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants; David.W. Slagle; Snow,
Christensen and Martineau; Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Dr. Chris Christensen.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Holli M. Mahoskey and Charles Mahoskey v. Ogden Clinic, Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Dr. Chris Christensen, No. 900423 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2812
UTfn COURT OF APPEALS 
L'-.-.l'tf 
LTAH 
•- 'vUMENT 
U 
o. 'Q 
OvCKETNO. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and 
CHARLES MAHOSKEY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD 
J. FARR and DR. CHRIS 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 900190 
Priority No. 16 
90 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE RONALD O. HYDE 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES DR. BOYD J. FARR AND OGDEN CLINIC 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO #4209 
PAUL H. JOHNSON #485 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
United Savings Plaza 
4185 Harrison Blvd., #320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL #3227 
CYNTHIA CAMPBELL #4286 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees Dr. Boyd J. Farr and 
Ogden Clinic 
DAVID W. SLAGLE #2975 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorney for Defendant 
Appellee Dr. Chris Christensen 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and 
CHARLES MAHOSKEY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD 
J. FARR and DR. CHRIS 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO #4209 
PAUL H. JOHNSON #485 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
United Savings Plaza 
4185 Harrison Blvd., #320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
Case No. 900190 
Priority No. 16 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL #3227 
CYNTHIA CAMPBELL #4 286 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees Dr. Boyd J. Farr and 
Ogden Clinic 
DAVID W. SLAGLE #2975 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorney for Defendant 
Appellee Dr. Chris Christensen 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE RONALD O. HYDE 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES DR. BOYD J. FARR AND OGDEN CLINIC 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STATEMENT OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD KNOWLEDGE OF A LEGAL INJURY 
IN 1985 AND THAT HER LAWSUIT IS BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 9 
A. The Statute of Limitations Began to Run When 
Plaintiff Discovered Her Injury and Attributed 
its Cause to the Possible Negligence of 
Defendants • 10 
B. Plaintiffs Failure to Obtain Medical 
and Legal Opinions of Negligence Did Not 
Prevent the Statute of Limitations From 
Running on Her Claim. 13 
c. The Statute of Limitations Was Not Tolled 
Until Plaintiff Resumed Her Normal 
Activities 16 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
REQUIRING TRIAL AND THAT DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 17 
A. Summary Judgment is a Viable and Necessary 
Judicial Remedy and was Properly Applied 
Here 17 
B. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
that Would Preclude Summary Judgment on the 
Statute of Limitations. 18 
i 
C. Plaintiff's Affidavit Statements Do Not 
Create an Issue of Fact Regarding Her 
Knowledge of Negligence 20 
D. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47 (1971) 
Does Not Abrogate Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM A-l 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
PAGES 
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 
723 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986) 2 
Brower v. Brown. 
744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) 23, 24 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 
784 P. 2d 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 13, 14 
Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs. Inc.r 
773 P. 2d 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 21 
Foil v. Ballinqer. 
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) 10, 14 
Harqett v. Limbert, 
598 F. Supp. 152 (D Utah 1984) 11, 14, 15 
Hove v. McMaster. 
621 P. 2d 694, (Utah 1980) 14 
McBride v. Jones. 
615 P. 2d. 431 (Utah 1980) 18 
Reagan Outdoor Adv. Inc. v. Lundqren, 
692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984) 18, 21 
Reiser v. Lohner, 
641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) 20, 23 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Anno. Section 78-2-2 (1989) 1 
Utah Code Anno. Section 78-12-47 (1) (1979) 2, 22 
Utah Code Anno. Section 78-14-4 (1) (1971) 2 , 3 , 9 
RULES 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2, 18 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
51 Am: Jur. 2d. Limitations of Actions, Section 17 et seq 
(1970) 17 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY, and 
CHARLES MAHOSKEY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD J. 
FARR, and DR. CHRIS 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 900190 
Priority No. 16 
00O00 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES DR. BOYD J. FARR AND OGDEN CLINIC 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Anno. Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STATEMENT 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the lower court properly determined that there were 
no genuine issues of material fact and that defendants were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff had 
knowledge of an injury, its cause and the possibility of 
negligence more than two years before she commenced her 
malpractice action. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the standard for 
appellate review of summary judgments as follows: 
"In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court will view the 
facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion 
and will allow the summary judgment to stand only if the movant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts." Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 
723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The statute of limitations governing this case is contained 
in Utah Code Anno. Section 78-14-4 (1) (1979): 
(1) No medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought unless it 
is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the injury, whichever first 
occurs... 
(Addendum P. A-8). 
The statute addressing bifurcation of trials in medical 
malpractice cases is contained in Utah Code Anno. Section 78-12-
47 (1971): 
In any action against a physician. . . for 
professional negligence or for rendering 
professional services without consent, if the 
responsive pleading of the defendant pleads 
that the action is barred by the statute of 
limitations, and if either party so moves 
the court, the issue raised thereby may be 
tried separately and before ciny other issues 
in the case are tried... 
(Addendum P. A-8). 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is set forth in 
the addendum, P. A-9. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case. 
This appeal is from a Second Judicial District Court order 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Dr. Boyd J. 
Farr, Dr. Chris Christensen, and Ogden Clinic, dismissing 
plaintiff Holli Mahoskey's medical malpractice complaint for 
failure to comply with the two year statute of limitations 
contained in Section 78-14-4 (1) Utah Code Anno. (1979). 
b. Course of proceedings. 
Holli Mahoskey served a Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
on defendants on November 1, 1988, alleging that they were 
negligent in failing to diagnose her breast cancer. She filed a 
complaint on February 24, 1989. Her husband, Charles Mahoskey, 
was also listed as a plaintiff. (R. at 1). 
Dr. Christensen filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint 
stating, inter alia, that it was time-barred on its face under 
Section 78-14-4(1). In response, Plaintiff requested leave of 
court to file an amended complaint alleging compliance with the 
statute. Judge Ronald 0. Hyde granted plaintiff's motion and an 
amended complaint was filed on May 8, 1989. (R. at 81). 
Defendants each filed motions to dismiss the amended 
complaint, alleging failure to comply with the statute of limit-
ations, failure to state a cause of action for Charles Mahoskey 
and failure to state grounds for punitive damages. Plaintiff did 
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not respond or object to defendants' motions regarding dismissal 
of Charles Mahoskey and the punitive damages claim. Following 
argument on the limitations issue, Judge Hyde ruled that the 
allegations of the amended complaint were sufficient to leave 
open the question of whether plaintiff had complied with the 
statute. Defendant Christensen filed a motion for separate 
trial on the limitations issue on July 14, 1989, which motion was 
stipulated to by plaintiff. (R. at 134). 
Holli Mahoskey's deposition was taken on September 29, 1989. 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment thereafter, alleg-
ing Ms. Mahoskey's testimony established that she had know-
ledge of a legal injury more than two years before her suit was 
commenced. (R. at 170, 175). 
c. Disposition at Trial Court. 
Judge Hyde issued a ruling granting defendants' motions on 
November 15, 1989, finding that plaintiff had knowledge of an 
injury, its cause, and the possibility of negligence in July, 
1985. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or in 
the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order, asking 
the court to set aside its ruling until the matter could be heard 
on oral argument. Following argument by all parties on December 
8, 1989, the court ruled that summary judgment was proper and 
that plaintiff's claims were barred under Section 78-14-4 (1) as 
a matter of law. Summary Judgment was entered on January 17, 
1990. (R. at 170, 175). 
On January 23, 1990 Plaintiff filed another Motion to Alter 
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or Amend Order of Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion 
for Relief from Order of Summary Judgment, on the grounds that a 
new case, Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P. 2d 1181 
(Utah 1989) had been issued by the Supreme Court of Utah since 
the time of the Court's ruling. Judge Hyde affirmed the order of 
summary judgment. The Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Alter 
or Amend Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion for Relief 
from Summary Judgment was entered on March 16, 1990. Plaintiff 
filed a Notice of Appeal on April 16, 1990. (R. at 381). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Holli Mahoskey, 25, found a small lump in her breast in 
February, 1985. (Plaintiff Holli Mahoskey's Deposition at 7; R. 
at 150). She scheduled a check-up appointment with her OB-GYN, 
Dr. Boyd K. Farr of the Ogden Clinic, for April 3, 1985, to have 
the lump examined for malignancy. Dr. Farr had been Ms. 
Mahoskey's physician since her first pregnancy in 1981. He had 
delivered her two children and performed her annual physical 
exams. At each appointment he had instructed her to check her 
breasts at least once a month for lumps and explained how to 
perform the procedure. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 4, 5 and 6; R. at 
147-149). 
Dr. Farr examined the lump and attempted its aspiration, 
without success. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 8). He called in Dr. 
Chris Christensen, a general surgeon with the Ogden Clinic, to 
also examine the lump. Ms. Mahoskey informed both doctors that 
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she had a history of cancer, but not breast cancer, in her 
family. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 7; R. at 150). At that time she 
was aware of tests that were available to determine whether 
cancer was present, including mammograms, X-rays and surgical 
biopsies. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 12; R. at 151). 
The lump was not diagnosed as cancerous. Ms. Mahoskey 
testified that she was instructed to continue regular self-
examinations of the lump and to come back in three months to have 
the lump re-checked. No further tests were ordered. 
(Plaintiff's Depo. at 12; R. at 151). 
The size of the lump remained unchanged until July 1985, at 
which time it began growing. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 15; R. at 
152). Ms. Mahoskey contacted Dr. James Gardner because she had 
grown suspicious of Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen and because she 
wanted a second opinion. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 18, 46 and deposi-
tion correction sheet; R. at 153, 161). Dr. Gardner examined the 
lump on July 15, 1985 and found it to be three times its earlier 
measurement. He was unsuccessful in aspirating the lump and 
stated that it definitely needed to be biopsied. A biopsy was 
performed on July 17, 1985 which revealed that the mass was 
cancerous. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 16-17; R. at 222, 223). Ms. 
Mahoskey's right breast was removed by modified radical 
mastectomy on July 19, 1985. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 18; R. at 
153). 
On the day her cancer was diagnosed, Ms. Mahoskey asked Dr. 
Gardner why Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen did not do something 
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three months earlier. Dr. Gardner stated that he did not know 
why they did not do anything. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 18; R. at 
153). On August 5, 1985 she asked Dr. Alton Wagnon, who perform-
ed her chemotherapy, why the doctors did not catch this three 
months earlier and whether she would not have had to go through 
what she did. Dr. Wagnon told her that if the cancer had been 
diagnosed earlier there would have been a good chance that she 
could have had a lumpectomy rather than a modified radical 
mastectomy. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 37-38; R. at 239,240). Ms. 
Mahoskey was angry with Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen at that time 
and felt they had made a mistake and should have diagnosed the 
cancer in April. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 38-39; R. at 240, 241). 
She has felt since July, 1985 that an early diagnosis would have 
made a difference in her case. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 36; R. at 
158). No doctor has ever told her that an earlier diagnosis 
would not have made a difference. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 38; R. at 
159) . 
Ms. Mahoskey underwent a sterilization procedure in August, 
1985. She asked Dr. Conrad Monson if the doctors had caught the 
cancer three months earlier whether she would be going through 
what she was experiencing at that time. He looked at her and did 
not say anything. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 27; R. at 233). 
Ms. Mahoskey had chemotherapy through February, 1986. She 
was sick during her chemotherapy. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 29; R. 
at 235). 
Ms. Mahoskey testified that she knew Dr. Farr and Dr. 
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Christensen had "screwed up" on her case, but that it was not on 
her mind every day. She did not really start thinking about it 
until her chemotherapy ended in February, 1986. (Plaintiff's 
Depo. at 57; R. at 165). 
Two and a half years later, Ms. Mahoskey consulted Dr. 
Stephen Ralston, a plastic surgeon, regarding breast reconstruc-
tion. She began considering a lawsuit following the September 
9, 1988 consultation because she could not afford the reconstruc-
tive procedure and thought the lawsuit might help cover the 
expense of surgery. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 55-56; R. at 163, 164). 
Plaintiff consulted an attorney regarding her claim against 
defendants in October, 1988. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 25-26; R. 
at 231, 232). Ms. Mahoskey testified that the information 
regarding possible medical negligence that she possessed at the 
time she discussed the lawsuit with her attorney was the same 
information she had possessed in July, 1985. (Plaintiff's Depo. 
at 28-29; R. at 156, 157). 
Ms. Mahoskey served a Notice of Intent to Commence Action on 
defendants on November 1, 1988. (R. at 2). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah law requires a plaintiff to commence a medical 
malpractice action within two years after a patient or plaintiff 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, a legal injury. Judge Hyde correctly ruled that 
Ms. Mahoskey's deposition testimony established she had 
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knowledge of her injury, its cause and the possibility of 
negligence in July, 1985. Plaintiff waited 39 months after her 
diagnosis before serving her Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
on defendants for failure to diagnose her breast cancer. Her 
case was initiated more than 15 months after the statute of 
limitations had expired and is time-barred under Utah Code Anno. 
Section 78-14-4 (1) (1979). The fact that plaintiff did not 
receive expert confirmation of her opinions of negligence did not 
toll the statute from running on her claim. 
An independent trial on the statute of limitations would not 
be justified here. There are no material issues of disputed fact 
on the limitations question, and defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment was correctly 
granted and the order dismissing plaintiff's complaint should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF A LEGAL INJURY IN 1985 AND 
THAT HER LAWSUIT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The statute of limitations governing medical malpractice 
actions in Utah requires a plaintiff to commence a lawsuit 
"within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
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the injury, whichever first occurs..." Utah Code Anno. Section 
78-14-4 (1) (1979). The Supreme Court of Utah has held that the 
two year statute begins to run "when an injured person knows or 
should know that he has suffered a legal injury,." Foil v. 
Ballincrer. 601 P. 2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979). Discovery of a "legal 
injury" under the statute has been defined by the Court as 
"discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in the 
injury." Id. at 148. 
Ms. Mahoskey acknowledges that the first prong of the Foil 
test was met here - she did have knowledge of her injury in 1985 
when her cancer was diagnosed and her breast removed. Plaintiff 
argues, however, that she did not have knowledge of the possibi-
lity that negligence caused her injury until moret than three 
years later. While plaintiff states that she was angry with Dr. 
Farr and felt he had made a mistake and should have diagnosed her 
cancer earlier, she maintains that she cannot be held to have 
possessed knowledge of possible negligence for three reasons: 
she never received a medical opinion confirming her suspicions of 
negligence, she was not informed of her cause of action by an 
attorney until 1988, and because she was ill and could not 
reasonably be expected to pursue her investigation until 
September, 1988. Her argument fails on each point. 
A. The Statute of Limitations Began to Run When 
Plaintiff Discovered Her Injury and Attributed its 
Cause to the Possible Necrlicremce of Defendants. 
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The question of when a plaintiff is held to possess know-
ledge of a "legal injury" under the Foil test was addressed by 
Judge David Winder in Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 
(D.Utah 1984), reversed on other grounds, 801 F. 2d 368 (10th 
Cir. 1986). Hargett parallels the present case in that both were 
summary judgment cases involving the alleged failure to diagnose 
a disease. In Hargett, a mother asked a doctor to examine her 
sick infant several times within one week. At each examination 
the doctor concluded that the child had a viral infection that 
would eventually run its course. A later spinal tap revealed 
the child was in fact suffering from meningitis. The boy was 
immediately hospitalized and suffered serious injuries. 
The boy's mother stated in her deposition that at the time 
her son was diagnosed with meningitis, she felt the severity of 
the illness may have been exacerbated by the doctor's failure to 
diagnose it earlier, and that she felt the doctor may have been 
negligent. She also testified that she had expressed those 
thoughts to a doctor upon the child's arrival at the hospital. 
The Court concluded that those deposition statements 
established that she discovered the boy had suffered a legal 
injury on the day she was informed of the diagnosis of 
meningitis. The Court rejected her arguments that she did not 
have knowledge of a "legal injury" because she had no medical 
training, had been informed by a doctor that her claim could not 
be legally proven, and because she did not consult an attorney 
for four years. Judge Winder said: 
-11-
Under Foil, and its progeny, a legal determination of 
negligence is not necessary to start the statute of 
limitations. Rather, the crucial question is whether 
the plaintiff was aware of the facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause 
of action against the health care provider. See, e.g., 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982); Hove v. 
McMaster, 621 P. 2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980) Foil. 601 
P. 2d at 148. Those facts include the existence of an 
injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence. 
Hargett, at 155. Since the plaintiff had failed to initiate her 
lawsuit within two years of discovering the injury, summary 
judgment on the statute of limitations was found proper. 
Applying the analysis of Hargett here, it is evident from 
Ms. Mahoskey's deposition statements that she had knowledge of 
"the existence of an injury, its cause and the possibility of 
negligence" on July 17, 1985. It is undisputed she was informed 
of her cancer on that date and testified she was angry with Dr. 
Farr for not diagnosing it earlier. Ms. Mahoskey has felt since 
1985 that an earlier diagnosis of her cancer could have resulted 
in a different outcome. She has stated that she felt defendants 
"screwed up" on her case, but did not really start thinking about 
it until after her chemotherapy ended in 1986. She has further 
testified she was aware at that time of medical procedures that 
existed to determine whether cancer was present. She knew her 
cancer had been diagnosed through a biopsy by Dr. Gardner and 
that a biopsy had not been performed during her April 
examination. Indeed, she discussed the earlier examination with 
Dr. Gardner on the day her cancer was diagnosed. Her deposition 
statements about that conversation are as follows: 
Q. Was there any discussion with [Dr. 
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Gardner] as to whether it should have been 
biopsied back in April? 
A* Yes, there was. 
Q. What did he tell you or what did you tell him? 
A. I said, Well, three months ago when I 
was here, why didn't they—why didn't they 
do something then? And he just—he didn't 
say anything. 
Q. Just didn't answer at all o r — 
A. He just says I don't know why they 
didn't do anything. 
(Plaintiff's Depo. at 18; R. at 153). 
Accordingly, Ms. Mahoskey's testimony establishes that on 
July 17, 1985 she was "aware of the facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause of action 
against the health care provider". Hargett, at 155. Nothing 
more is required to start the statute of limitations running. 
B. Plaintiff's Failure to Obtain Medical and Legal 
Opinions of Negligence Did Not Prevent the Statute of 
Limitations From Running on Her Claim. 
Plaintiff argues that despite her deposition statements, she 
did not have knowledge of possible medical negligence because her 
physicians did not confirm her lay suspicions of negligence. 
This argument was recently rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In Deschamps a plaintiff's mother was prescribed drugs 
which allegedly resulted in the woman's developing vasculitis. 
An attorney was hired to investigate the woman's medical care 
shortly before her death in 1984. He filed a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action after the woman died. The attorney sought an 
expert opinion on the quality of care rendered and was informed 
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by a physician that his client had no grounds for a malpractice 
claim. He relayed the expert opinion to his client and closed 
his file. 
The daughter continued to feel uneasy about the events 
surrounding her mother's death and hired a new attorney who 
obtained an expert opinion in May, 1986 that confirmed the 
daughter's suspicions of negligence. The attorney served a 
Notice of Intent and a complaint was filed in January, 1988. The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendcmts, finding 
that the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the 
claim more than two years prior to filing her action.. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued (similar to plaintiff's 
reasoning here), that "she could not know of the legal injury 
under section 78-14-4 until she obtained a favorable expert 
opinion confirming her lay suspicion of negligence." Deschamps, 
at 473. The Court rejected that argument. Citing Hove v. 
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Assocs. Inc. 773 P. 2d 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Hargett v. 
Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), the Court concluded: 
If we accepted [the plaintiff's] position that she 
could not know of her legal injury until she received 
an expert medical opinion confirming malpractice, the 
statute would be tolled in every case until a plaintiff 
not only decided to seek, but found expert medical 
testimony. We do not believe this result is consistent 
with the purpose of the statutory scheme. 
Deschamps, at 475. Summary judgment dismissing the suit was 
accordingly affirmed. 
In similar fashion, the fact that Ms. Mahoskey's physicians 
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did not confirm her suspicions of negligence, did not prevent the 
statute from running on her claim. Even if each of Ms. 
Mahoskey's statements regarding her conversations with her 
subsequent treating physicians is viewed in the light most 
favorable to her position, those statements do not excuse her 
three year delay in commencing her suit. She was never informed 
by any physician that an earlier diagnosis would not have made a 
difference in her case. She has certainly never raised 
allegations of fraudulent concealment of facts regarding her 
medical care. Indeed, she possessed the same facts regarding her 
treatment in 1985 as she did in 1988. Based on her knowledge of 
those facts, the statute began running when her cancer was 
diagnosed and she associated her injury with the alleged 
negligence of defendants. The limitations period was not tolled 
because she failed to receive expert medical opinions of 
negligence. 
Nor was the statute tolled because Ms. Mahoskey was not 
informed of her cause of action for malpractice until she 
contacted an attorney in 1988. As noted above, this issue was 
addressed by Judge Winder in Haraett. where the plaintiff opposed 
a motion for summary judgment by alleging the physicians she 
consulted had led her to conclude her claims could not be legally 
proven. The plaintiff argued, as Ms. Mahoskey does here, that as 
a lay person she accordingly could not have discovered a legal 
injury until she consulted an attorney, four years later. Judge 
Winder ruled "that argument is without merit and confuses legal 
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injury with a legal conclusion of negligence". Hargett, at 154-
155. It was the facts known to the plaintiff, including her 
opinions of negligence, that were determinative in calculating 
when the statute began running, not when the plaintiff was 
informed of her cause of action. In this case, Judge Hyde 
correctly ruled that Ms. Mahoskey obtained knowledge of facts 
sufficient to start the limitations period running on her claim 
in 1985, not in 1988 when she requested legal advice. 
C. The Statute of Limitations was Not Tolled Until 
Plaintiff Resumed Her Normal Activities. 
Ms. Mahoskey argues that she was unable to function 
normally until August, 1988 and that the statute of limitations 
was therefore tolled until September of that year. She states 
that at that time she discovered, through reasonable diligence, 
that there was a possibility of negligence by defendants. She 
cites to no facts that she discovered at that time that led her 
to form that conclusion. Indeed, Ms. Mahoskey has testified that 
she received no new information between 1985 and the time she 
consulted a lawyer in October, 1988. 
As stated above, Ms. Mahoskey's testimony shows she had 
knowledge of an injury, its cause and the possibility of 
negligence in 1985. To toll the statute until the time she 
states she resumed her normal activities would render the statute 
meaningless. By definition the statute at issue here requires an 
injury before it starts running. It is assumed, therefore, that 
all such cases would have at least some period of illness or 
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disability following the injury. To allow the statute to be 
tolled to a date a plaintiff designates as the time normal 
activities were resumed would make the statute entirely 
subjective and governed by a plaintiff's own determination as to 
when discovery of a legal injury was reasonable. 
Statutes of limitation are founded upon good and fair 
principles. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d. Limitations of Actions, Section 
17 et seq. (1970). They are enacted to ensure claims are 
advanced within a reasonable time so an opposing party has a 
fair opportunity to defend against them. Statutory and case law 
exemptions from the bar of the statute exist in numerous 
situations; none of those exceptions apply here. Ms. Mahoskey 
failed to commence her action within the time frame designated by 
the legislature and her suit is time-barred as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT REQUIRING TRIAL AND THAT DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Summary Judgment is a Viable and Necessary Judicial 
Remedy and was Properly Applied Here. 
Defendants agree with plaintiff's general analysis of 
summary judgment procedures and cautions. It should be noted, 
however, that the granting of summary judgment to a party 
entitled thereto is not discretionary with the trial court. Rule 
56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in part: 
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The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving part is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
(Addendum, P. A-9) (Emphasis added). 
As noted in Utah cases, summary judgment has the salutary 
purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial 
that would be to no avail. McBride v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 431, 432 
(Utah 1980). It is essential to the court in enabling it to 
pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue to present to the fact finder. Reagan Outdoor Adv. Inc. v. 
Lundgren, 692 P. 2d. 776 (Utah 1984) 
The trial court concluded that Ms. Mahoskey's deposition 
statements establish she had knowledge of her legal injury more 
than two years prior to filing suit. Summary judgment was 
accordingly mandated on those facts and properly ordered under 
the requirements of Rule 56. 
B. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact That 
Would Preclude Summary Judgment on the Statute of 
Limitations. 
Plaintiff argues that "the District Court did not construe 
the facts as presented by plaintiff in any way, but instead, 
summarily rejected them." (Plaintiff's brief at 15). While 
defendants have denied negligence in plaintiff's medical 
treatment, that issue was not before the trial court. Instead, 
all facts presented were limited to the question of when Ms. 
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Mahoskey had knowledge of her legal injury. The facts were 
accordingly not in dispute, nor was plaintiff's presentation of 
the facts rejected by the court as she contends. Defendants 
supplemented the statement of facts set forth by plaintiff, but 
the additional facts were taken exclusively from Ms. Mahoskey's 
deposition statements. They were presented to give the court a 
complete summary of the facts known to plaintiff regarding her 
legal injury. 
Judge Hyde ruled that those facts, taken as a whole, 
establish that Holli Mahoskey knew of the possibility of 
negligence by defendants in 1985. Even with each fact construed 
in her favor, it is undisputed that her cancer was diagnosed in 
July, 1985, that she knew it had not been diagnosed by defendants 
in April, that she knew additional diagnostic tests had not been 
ordered, that she was angry with defendants and concluded they 
had made a mistake, and that she felt if her cancer had been 
diagnosed earlier she may have been able to have less drastic 
procedures than a mastectomy. 
Ms. Mahoskey does not dispute that she had knowledge of 
those facts in 1985. Instead, her argument appears directed to 
the significance she attached to those facts. The statute of 
limitations begins running when a plaintiff "discovers or should 
have discovered, the injury." It is difficult to conceive of a 
factual situation that would more clearly trigger the statute of 
limitations on a case of an alleged failure to diagnose than the 
situation presented here. If the statute is to survive as a real 
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and meaningful doctrine in malpractice actions, it must be 
enforced on the facts known to a plaintiff, and not the 
plaintiff's reaction to those facts. 
C. Plaintiff's Affidavit Statements Do Not Create An Issue 
of Fact Regarding Her Knowledge of Negligence. 
A plaintiff's affidavit statements that he or she did not 
have knowledge of the possibility of negligence do not, in 
themselves, give rise to a question of fact. This Court 
addressed the use of affidavits in opposing summary judgments in 
Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P. 2d 93 (Utah 1982) wherein a plaintiff's 
claims for personal injuries were dismissed for failure to comply 
with the malpractice statute of limitations. The plaintiff's 
husband argued that summary judgment had been improperly granted 
because he had filed an affidavit stating that he had only become 
aware of the extent of his wife's problems a year after her 
injury. The Court held: 
Mr. Reiser filed an affidavit wherein he 
asserted a belief that his wife's disorders 
were temporary and that he did not become 
aware of any permanent damage until June, 
1972. Such declaration of his belief was not 
sufficient to raise an issue of fact. 
Furthermore, the very acknowledgment that his 
wife was suffering disorders as a result of 
the incident (whether temporary or perman-
nent) would show that plaintiffs should have 
known that they had suffered legal injury at 
the time of the cardiac arrest. 
Id. at 100. 
While the Reiser affidavit addressed knowledge of permanency 
of injury, the same reasoning would apply to affidavits regarding 
knowledge of possible negligence. Ms. Mahoskey has testified 
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that she concluded in 1985 that Dr. Farr made a mistake in not 
diagnosing her cancer. An issue of fact is not raised by her 
later affidavit statement that she had no basis for that conclu-
sion. In Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 P. 2d 401 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that where a 
party takes a clear position in a deposition that is not modified 
on cross examination, he may not then file an affidavit to raise 
an issue of fact by contradicting his earlier testimony, unless a 
satisfactory explanation of the discrepancy is provided. 
In Floyd the plaintiff's deposition testimony established 
that his physician had informed him more than two years prior to 
his commencing suit that he had performed more extensive surgery 
than that which was authorized. The plaintiff stated that he had 
attributed his on-going symptoms to the additional surgery at 
that time. He later sought to change his testimony by filing an 
affidavit that controverted his earlier statements as to when he 
discovered his symptoms were caused by the unauthorized surgery. 
While the plaintiff maintained his affidavit statements 
should be controlling on the issue, the Court of Appeals upheld 
exclusion of the affidavit and found that the plaintiff had made 
a connection between the additional surgery and his symptoms more 
than two years prior to commencing his suit. Summary judgment 
was accordingly affirmed. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated "specific facts are 
required to show whether there is a genuine issue for trial. The 
allegations of a pleading or factual conclusions of an affidavit 
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are insufficient to raise a genuine* issue of fact." Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc v. Lundgren, 692 P. 2d. 776, 779 (Utah 
1984). If an issue of fact could be created solely by an 
affiant's statements regarding discovery of negligence, summary 
judgment would never be appropriate when affidavits addressing 
knowledge were filed, and all limitations issues addressing 
discovery would necessarily require trial. Instead, as evidenced 
by Floyd and Reiser, Utah courts take the position that it is the 
facts known to a plaintiff that determine when a plaintiff knew 
or should have known of the possibility of medical negligence, 
and not a plaintiff's affidavit conclusions. 
D. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47 Does Not 
Abrogate Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Plaintiff argues that Utah Code Anno. Section 78-12-47 (1953 
as amended) raises a presumption in favor of trial on the statute 
of limitations issue in malpractice suits. The statute reads: 
In any action against a physician . . . for 
professional negligence or for rendering professional 
services without consent, if the responsive pleciding of 
the defendant pleads that the action is barred by the 
statute of limitations, and if either party so moves 
the court, the issue raised thereby may be tried 
separately and before any other issues in the case are 
tried... 
(Addendum, P. A-7) 
Defendants maintain that this statute was not intended to 
bar summary judgment when the trial court is presented facts 
enabling it to conclude as a matter of law that a plaintiff had 
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knowledge of a legal injury more than two years prior to 
commencing suit. The statute does not provide for a trial 
whenever lack of knowledge of negligence is raised. 
In Reiser v. Lohner. supra, the plaintiffs argued that the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their 
claim because under Section 78-12-47 they were entitled to a jury 
trial on the limitations issue. The Court rejected that 
argument, stating "[t]he statute . . . permits an independent 
trial on the limitations issue. It is, however, like all other 
issues, subject to summary judgment if no genuine issues of 
material fact are raised". Reiser, at 100. 
Plaintiff cites Brower v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 1337 (Utah 1987) 
as support for her position that a presumption exists in favor of 
granting a party a trial on the issue of knowledge of negligence. 
It should be noted, however, that summary judgment was reversed 
in Brown only on the question of whether plaintiff had knowledge 
that her adverse symptoms were caused by an an improperly 
performed hysterectomy. The plaintiff had maintained that her 
sister had experienced similar adverse symptoms following a 
hysterectomy and that plaintiff had no knowledge of negligence 
until she was informed that she had a cause of action for 
malpractice by an emergency room physician. The Court concluded 
that those facts raised an issue as to whether she should have 
associated her symptoms with negligence and reversed the summary 
j udgment. 
The summary judgment was not reversed as to plaintiff's 
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claims regarding a puncture wound in her leg that she received 
during the same surgery. By a divided Court Justice Zimmerman 
held: 
While it may be that there is a factual ques-
tion as to when plaintiff knew the 
hysterectomy had been done improperly and was 
causing her problems, there is no question 
on the record that on October 22, 1980, when 
plaintiff was wheeled out of the recovery 
room and saw blood spurting from the wound in 
her leg, she knew that she had received a 
puncture wound that was not part of her 
surgical procedure. She inquired about the 
wound and never received a satisfactory 
explanation as to how it occurred. This was 
enough, as a matter of law, to place her on 
notice that she had received a legal injury. 
Accordingly, I believe the trial court's 
summary judgment on this issue should be 
affirmed. 
Id. at 1340. (Emphasis added). 
In similar fashion, the diagnosis of Ms. Mahoskey's cancer 
and removal of her breast coupled with her failure to receive a 
satisfactory explanation regarding defendants7 examination, was 
enough to place plaintiff on notice of her legal injury as a 
matter of law. She was not entitled to a trial on that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff has failed to comply with the two year 
statute of limitations for malpractice claims. To allow this 
suit to proceed would establish a subjective measure whereby a 
plaintiff's reaction to facts, rather than the facts themselves, 
would control when the statute begins to run. The trial court's 
order of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully Submitted this / day of August, 1990. 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Rigffi&b w. CAMPBELL A ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Ogden Clinic 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Richard W. Campbell, certify that on August J , 1990 I 
served the attached Brief of Appellees Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Ogden 
Clinic upon the parties listed below by mailing four copies by 
first class mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Paul H. Johnson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
4185 Harrison Blvd. #320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
David W. Slagle 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorney for Appellee 
Dr. Chris Christensen 
10 Exchange Place 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
DATED this *y day of August, 1990. 
RlCHARlTW. CAMPBELL 
Attorney for Appel!J/6es 
Dr. Boyd J. Farr and 
Ogden Clinic 
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RICHARD W. CAMPBELL #3627 
CYNTHIA CAMPBELL #4286 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Ogden Clinic and Dr. Boyd J. Farr 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
i 
JAty 1 ?
 Wan ou 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and : 
CHARLES MAHOSKEY, 
Plaintiffs, : 
VS. : 
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD J. FARR : 
and DR. CHRIS CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. : 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil NO. 89-0901488 
: Judge Ronald O. Hyde 
Defendants Ogden Clinic, Dr. Boyd J. Farr, and Dr. Chris 
Christensen, having moved the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment in their 
favor and against plaintiffs, and the Court having reviewed the 
files and pleadings herein and being fully advised in the 
premises, and having issued a ruling granting summary judgment 
for defendants on November 15, 1989, and plaintiffs having filed 
a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion 
for Relief from Judgment or Order, and the motions having been 
set for oral argument, 
WHEREFORE, the motions came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on December 8, 1989; plaintiff Holli M. 
Mahoskey was present and was represented by her attorneys Paul H. 
Johnson and Douglas M. Durbano; defendant Dr. Chris Christensen, 
A-l 
?*.->. 318 
Recorded Book Jl ,0.(J 
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I Indexed I 
MAHOSKEY V. OGDEN CLINIC et al. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0901488 
Page 2 
was represented by his attorney David W. Slagle; defendants Ogden 
Clinic and Dr. Boyd J. Farr were represented by their attorneys 
Richard W. Campbell and Cynthia Campbell; oral argument was 
presented by each party; the Court having heard the arguments 
enters its order, based upon the Court's Ruling on Defendants' 
Motion, as follows: 
The statute of limitations is not tolled until plaintiff 
consults an attorney. Evidence here indicates that the plaintiff 
had knowledge of the existence of an injury, its cause and the 
possibility of negligence in July, 1985, and that her lawsuit is 
based solely on information she possessed in July, 1985. There 
is no evidence that the defendants did anything to delay the 
filing of this action. 
There is no genuine issue of any material fact that would 
preclude the granting of summary judgment. Plaintiff has failed 
to comply with the two year statute of limitations. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary 
Judgment is granted in favor of defendants Ogden Clinic, Dr. Boyd 
J. Farr, and Dr. Chris Christensen, with prejudice, no cause of 
action. Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the 
Alternative, Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order is denied. 
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DATED this / (o day of Decefober, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
B^LE RONALD 0. ?YDE 
District Court Judgej 
Approved asyto form: 
Paul H. Johftson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this |4 day 
of December, 1989 to the following: 
Paul H. Johnson 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4185 Harrison Boulevard #320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
David W. Slagle 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Chris Christensen, M.D« 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Penny Pac 
Secretary 
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DAVID W. SLAGLE A297 5 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Dr. Chris Christensen 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and CHARLES 
HAHOSKEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD J. 
FARR, and DR. CHRIS 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
NO. 89-091488 
Judge Ronald Hyde 
On or about January 23, 1990, plaintiff, by and through her 
attorney of record, filed her Motion to Alter or Amend the Prior 
Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, a Motion for Relief from 
Summary Judgment. The Court reviewed plaintiff's Motion, the 
supporting Memorandum, the Memoranda filed by counsel for 
defendants, and the Reply Memorandum filed by plaintiff. On 
February 27, 1990, this Court issued its Ruling denying 
plaintiff's Motions. Accordingly, it is 
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Motions to 
Alter or Amend the Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, 
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from summary Judgment, is hereby 
denied. 
DATED this /£ day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
RONALD 0. HYDE ; 
DISTRICT JUDGE ^ 
3«ADWS\ 1022<*. 58i»\0rder 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATS CF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Rebecca Boothe, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant Chris Christensen, M.D. herein; that she served the 
attached (proposed) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion tc Alter or 
Amend Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion for Relief From 
Summary Judgment (Case Number 89-0901458, Second Judicial 
District Court) upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Douglas M. Durbano, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
4185 Harrison Boulevard #320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Richard w. Campbell, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants Farr and Ogden Clinic 
2485 Grant Avenue #200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
/ L~ 
on the'£ day of March, 1990. 
Rebecca Boothe 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (p& day of March, 
1990. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the S ta te of Uath 
My Commission JElxpires : 
H M - 9 M . L R . B K - .
 A_7 
«,.' Li** C»ty uran z± • 
•, Cr>rnmiu»on Expires 
January U. 10^4 
STATE OF UTAH ' 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-14-4(1) (1979) 
Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the 
health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully 
left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discoverss, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully 
left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs: and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient 
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a 
health care provider because that health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever occurs first. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47 (1971) 
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in 
malpractice actions. 
In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist, 
osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical therapist, 
registered nurse, clinical laboratory bioanalyst, clinical 
laboratory technologist, or a licensed hospital, person, firm or 
corporation as the employer of any such person for professionaal 
negligence or for rendering professional services without 
consent, if the responsive pleadings of the defendant pleads that 
the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and if either 
party so moves the court, the issue raised thereby may be tried 
separately and before any other issues in the case are tried. If 
the issue raised by the defense of the statute of limitations is 
finally determined in favor of the plaintiff, the remaining 
issues shall them be tried. 
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive. 
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Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or 
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summmary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear 
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for resons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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